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Abstract 
This paper presents empirical assessments of the competitiveness of the 
banking industry in China during 1985-2001. Since asset concentration in China’s 
banking industry does not seem to be decreasing, and since it has long been 
believed that banking industry concentration impairs competitiveness, it is 
worthwhile to assess the state of competition there. In this paper, we use the 
Panzar-Rosse method in various ways in order to ensure the robustness of the 
results. The conclusion is that the  banking system in China was already near a 
state of perfect competition before foreign banks began to enter China’s financial 
market. 
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1. Introduction 
After the financial reform of 1994, China’s financial system changed 
dramatically. Three state policy banks—the Export Import Bank of China, 
National Development Bank and Agricultural Development Bank of China—were 
established, while the four biggest state-owned commercial banks—the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Construction Bank 
of China and Bank of China—were encouraged to become independent 
commercial banks. By the end of 1996, 17 new banks were established, including 
the Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial Bank, and China Merchants 
Bank, with different characteristics from the four largest banks. Their business 
area is not restricted by the state, and they can operate fairly freely. Since China 
became a Member State of the WTO in 2001, the entry by foreign financial 
institutions into China has accelerated. Banks now have to be managed 
efficiently. 
The number of banks and the inflow of foreign investment have increased 
rapidly, and competition in the banking sector has become much more severe over 
the past several years. It is a common belief that China's banking sector is not 
very competitive, though to our knowledge there have been no empirical 
assessments of it. 
Recently, many empirical assessments analyzing banking competition have 
been published. Claessens and Laeven (2003) use the method of Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) to examine the banking industry in 50 countries, and conclude that nearly 
all countries have monopolistic competition. The competition in Brazil, Mexico 
and UK is much higher than in the U.S. Shaffer and Disalvo (1994) find that 
Pennsylvania in the U.S. has duopoly market conditions, but that the degree of 
banking industry competition is still high. Murjan and Ruza (2002) assess the 
Arab Middle Eastern banking markets, and Gelos and Roldos (2002) examine the 
banking industry in eight countries in Latin America and Europe. All these 
surveys use the Panzar and Rosse model, and find that the banking industries in 
almost all countries are in a state of monopolistic competition. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the degree of competition of the banking 
industry in China before its affiliation with the WTO, using a rigidly statistical 
technique, i.e., the method of Panzar and Rosse. Generally speaking, the banking 
system in China is close to perfect competition, and the degree of competition is 
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considerably higher than in other countries. Looking at individual years, 1996, 
1997, 1999 and 2000 are found to feature perfect competition and 1998 to have 
monopolistic competition, with the data indicating a very high degree of 
competition. The four largest banks in China over 1985-2001 were in a state of 
monopolistic competition. On the other hand, it is surprising that, from 1996 to 
2000, the competition among small-scale banks was perfect. We checked the 
robustness of these results using some dummy variables, but they were hardly 
affected. This implies that, before China acceded to the WTO in 2001, its banking 
system was already quite competitive. From the results above, it is found that 
opening the Chinese banking market to foreign institutions will not promote 
further competition, though it will have effects on firms’ financing. 
    This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Panzar-Rosse 
method as described in Nathan and Neave (1989) and previous studies . Section 3 
presents the situation of the Chinese banking system and the characteristic of the 
data. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis. Section 5 draws conclusions. 
 
2. The Panzar-Rosse Method in Nathan and Neave (1989) and Previous Studies  
2.1 The Panzar-Rosse method in Nathan and Neave (1989)  
The Panzar-Rosse method is used to estimate the degree of competitiveness. 
The estimation is relatively to perform because there few assumptions need to be 
made. Furthermore, the Panzar-Rosse method is used widely, so it can be used to 
compare the results for the Chinese banking industry with those of other 
countries.  
As the Panzar-Rosse method in Nathan and Neave (1989) will be used to 
estimate banking in China in this paper, that method will be introduced in this 
section. 
 Loan losses are considered to be an important element in the income of banks in 
Nathan and Neave (1989). Therefore, TRLL (total revenue less provision of loan 
losses) is a dependent variable that can be explained using interest rate and other 
expenses as independent variables. The Panzar-Rosse model specified by Nathan 
and Neave (1989) is as follows: 
 
iiiiiii gDBRfASTePLdPKBcPFbaTRLL 6)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(lnln ++++++= , 
(1) 
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where 
  TRLL=total revenue less provision for loan losses  
  PF=interest expenses/total deposits（unit price of funds） 
  PKB=premises expenditure/number of branches（unit price of capital） 
  PL=wages and salary expenses/number of employees（unit price of labour） 
  AST=total assets 
  BR=number of branches/total number of branches in the system 
  Ｄ6= 1 for the six largest banks 
0 for other banks                  
 
here, they define H=b+c+d. Panzar-Rosse shows that, 
 
      0    monopoly ≤
   H    ∈(0,１)  monopolistic competition 
      =1   perfect competition 
 
PF, PKB, and PL, are prices of input factors, and AST, BR, and D6 are proxies 
for other variables that have an effect on equilibrium revenue. In Nathan and 
Neave (1989), a regression without loan losses and a regression where loan losses 
are used as input price variables are both estimated. The results from both are 
quite similar. 
Incidentally, Gunji and Yuan (2004) find that the H-statistic becomes greater 
than unity if firms with increasing-return-to-scale technology choose a saddle 
point under certain conditions. However, a value greater than unity is not 
actually observed. 
 
2.2 Previous studies 
There are many studies on the competitiveness of banking systems using the 
Panzar-Rosse method, as shown in Table 1. Banks, trust companies, and 
mortgage companies in Canada are assessed using the Panzar-Rosse method in 
Nathan and Neave (1989). The result is that the hypothesis of monopoly is 
rejected in all cases, and perfect competition is accepted in some cases. These 
results are the same as Shaffer (1993). Furthermore, they conclude that banks 
are much more competitive than trust companies and mortgage companies in 
Canada. Nathan and Neave (1989) hypothesize that international business, 
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which is conducted in a highly competitive market, makes up a significant 
fraction of bank business, but that trust companies and mortgage companies are 
only engaged in the domestic market. 
  Niimi (1998) estimates the banking industry in Japan during the peak of the 
bubble (1989.3-1991.3) and the period near the bubble’s end (1994.3-1996.3). 
Competition in banking in Japan is found to be monopolistic during the peak of 
the bubble. Then during the period near the bubble’s end, it is monopolistic 
competition. 
 There are also many studies that examine the banking industry in Europe, such 
as Molyneux et al. (1994), who estimate the banking industry in Germany, UK, 
France, Italy, and Spain using the Panzar-Rosse model. They find that the 
banking industry in Italy is a monopoly and that the others are in monopolistic 
competition. Bikker and Haaf (2002) assess the banking industry in 17 European 
countries and six countries that are outside of Europe. They conclude that all the 
countries have nearly monopolistic competition. They also find that the 
environment for big banks is much more competitive than that for small banks, 
and also that the environment in the international market is much more 
competitive than in the local market. 
 There are also a number of assessments of banking industries in developing 
countries. Claessens and Laeven (2003) estimate the banking industry in 50 
countries using the Panzar-Rosse method. They conclude that nearly all countries 
are in monopolistic competition. Eight countries in Europe and South America, all 
of which have gone through some process of consolidation, are estimated in Gelos 
and Roldos (2002). Argentina and Hungary are found to be in nearly perfect 
competition. Furthermore, they conclude that even when the degree of 
concentration is high, the degree of competition is not decreased. In this paper, we 
find the same result for China. Murjan and Ruza (2002) assess the countries in 
the Arab Middle East from 1993 to 1997 and obtain a result of monopolistic 
competition. They also find that oil-producing countries are less competitive than 
non-oil-producing countries. 
 From the above, the significant observation is made that banking industries in 
almost all countries are in monopolistic competition. However, the banking 
industry in China has not been investigated before. 
 
3. The Banking Industry in China  
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3.1 The situation of the banking industry in China 
 The banking system in China includes the People’s Bank of China, the state 
policy banks, the state-owned commercial banks, and other commercial banks. 
The state-owned commercial banks include the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, and Bank of 
China. By the end of 2001, 70% of the total assets of the banking industry were 
held by the four largest state-owned banks. CITIC Industrial Bank, China 
Everbright Banking Co., Ltd, China Minsheng Bank Corp., Ltd, China Huaxia 
Bank, China Merchants Bank, Bank of Communications, Guang Dong 
Development Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, ShenZhen Development Bank Co., 
Ltd, and Yantai House Saving Bank are other commercial banks. Table 2 provides 
a classification of banks in China. 
The State Policy Banks operate with the aim of accomplishing the state’s policy 
for industrial or regional development, and not principally for posting large 
profits. Therefore, the People’s Bank of China, which is the central bank, and the 
three state policy banks are not included in our observations. The four largest 
banks are controlled by the state, and not only are they prevented from dealing 
with trust investments and equity affairs, but they are also unable to invest in 
non-bank, non-bank firm and real estate businesses. 
 
3.2. Description of the data 
 We use data from balance sheets and statements of income reported in China 
Financial Yearbooks from 1985 to 2002. The China Financial Yearbook is edited 
by The People’s Bank of China and published each November. It records each 
bank’s balance sheet and statement of income for the previous fiscal year.  
  In the China Financial Yearbook, there are some differences in the content of 
balance sheets and statements of income among banks. At times, the studied 
samples do not have the necessary data, so they were deleted. Table 3 shows the 
summary statistics from 1996 to 2001. For cross-sectional data, 14 or 15 banks 
were studied as samples. For panel data, there are 71 observations for all banks 
during 1997-2000, 35 and 26 observations for the four largest banks during 
1985-1993 and during 1995-2001, and 52 observations for small banks during 
1996-2000. 
Following the interpretation in Bikker and Haaf (2002), the H-statistic ranges 
between 0 and 1, and a large value indicates greater competitive than a small 
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value. If the revenue equations, demand elasticity, and quantity of banks are the 
same in the various markets, the H-statistic can be used to make comparisons by 
country and size of banks. Thus, in this paper we assume that the H-statistic is 
between 0 and 1, and that a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of 
competition. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Competition Test 
In this paper, we analyze competition if the banking industry in China using 
the following equation: 
 
iiiiii ASTePKLdBEcEIbaTR ε++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝ ,       （2） 
                                    
where 
 
TR=Operating revenue 
Under the accounting standards of China, revenues from loans, security 
transactions, and exchange trades are included in operating revenue. Other 
sources of operating revenue are interest revenue, inter-bank transaction revenue, 
and revenue from other charges. 
In Nathan and Neave (1989), TRLL (gross revenue less provision for loan 
losses) is used as a dependent variable. They also estimate the regression when 
the gross revenue is used as a dependent variable. They find that there is no 
significant difference between the two regressions. On the other hand, gross 
revenue is used as a dependent variable in Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994). In this 
paper, operating revenue is used as a dependent variable, and for comparison, 
interest revenue is also used as a dependent variable in the estimation.   
 
EI=(expense of interest rate + expense of inter-bank transfers) / total assets 
This is the expense for the interest rate and expense for inter-bank transfers 
per asset. This variable is considered to be the price for borrowing funds. Banks 
are considered to be firms that produce loans and investment. Deposits and funds 
are regarded as inputs. In this paper, expenses for the interest rate plus expenses 
for inter-bank transfers are considered to be expenses of interest. In accordance 
with the accounting standards of banking in China, interest costs represent the 
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expenditures when raising funds, including expenses for interest on deposits, 
interest on bonds, interest expenses for other credits, and the cost of borrowing 
from foreign countries. Expenses for inter-bank are expenditures when 
transactions are carried out with other financial firms. Furthermore, the cost of 
borrowing from the central bank, interest cost of inter-bank deposits, interest cost 
of foreign inter-bank deposits and expenditures for deposits of other finance firms 
are included.  
 
BE=(service charges + other operating costs) / total assets 
This represents service charges and other operating costs per asset. Based on 
the accounting standards of China, service charges represent the cost for all types 
of consignment. Other operating costs are those that are not directly related with 
business, including extra-ordinary losses and amortization on deferred assets, as 
well as those that are not related with the normal businesses of bank. 
 
PKL= operating costs / total assets 
This represents operating costs per asset. In Nathan and Neave (1989), wages 
and salaries per unit are included as independent variables. Data on wages and 
salaries for banking in China are not available, so operating costs are used 
instead. Based on the accounting standards of banking in China, wages and 
salaries are included in operating costs, and if the data on wages and salaries 
become available, the estimation should be much more correct. 
 
AST= total assets 
Total assets are used as a variable for identifying economy of scale. They are 
included in the regression, as it is in Nathan and Neave (1989), and Claessens 
and Laeven (2003). 
Here, the H-statistic is H=b+c+d. In order to test the hypothesis of H=1 or H=0, 
the F-test is used. 
Moreover, as a method to investigate the effect of scale, a dummy variable is 
used. First, we will estimate the regression including as a dummy variable the 
four biggest banks (DL) in this paper, as equation (3). For the four largest banks, 
DL=1, and for others, DL=0. We then estimate a regression using as a dummy 
variable banks that are operated over the whole country (DA), as equation (4). For 
banks that operate over the whole country, DA =1, and for others, DA=0.  
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 iiiiiii fDLASTePKLdBEcEIbaTR ε+++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝ .   （3） 
  iiiiiii gDAASTePKLdBEcEIbaTR ε+++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝    (4) 
 
4.2 Equilibrium test 
 From Shaffer (1982), we estimate ROA as a dependent variable and define the 
equilibrium E statistic as the sum of the parameters. The reason for this is that if 
the market is in equilibrium, a dependent variable will have no correlation with 
prices of input factors. The same goes for estimating the ROE (revenue on equity) 
as a dependent variable. Both are in equilibrium when E=0, and in disequilibrium 
when E 0. Since the assumption of the Panzar-Rosse model is long-run 
equilibrium, we will test whether the banking industry market in China is in 
equilibrium or not. The following equation is regressed: 
≠
 
iiiiii ASTePKLdBEcEIbaROA ε++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝  ,     (5) 
 
where, ROA is the ratio of total revenue to total assets before tax. In this paper, 
E=b+c+d. We use a F-test to examine whether E=0 or not. Table 4 is the result of 
equation (5). 
2001 shows a significant difference from E=0 at the 10 percent level (p<0.1). 
This indicates that the banking industry market is not in equilibrium in 2001. For 
the equilibrium hypothesis of Panzar-Rosse, we have to exclude the data of 2001. 
 
4.3 The data for each year 
In order to estimate changes taking place in the banking industry of China in 
each year from 1996 to 2000, we use the data of each year, applying the 
Panzar-Rosse model.  
Table 5 shows the results of the H-statistic without the dummy of the four 
largest banks. The H-statistics are 0.860 and 0.903 in 1996 and 1997. From the 
F-test, H=1 cannot be rejected and H=0 is rejected. Therefore, we obtain the 
result that the banking industry market of China in 1996 and in 1997 was in a 
state of perfect competition. For 1998, the H-statistic is 0.779, but the F-tests for 
H=0 and H=1 are both rejected at the 10% level. This means that the H-statistic is 
between 1 and 0, so the banking industry market was in a state of monopolistic 
competition, though the degree was quite high. Since the H-statistics for 1999 and 
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2000 are 0.868 and 0.946, the hypothesis H=1 cannot be rejected by the F-test at 
the 10% level. Therefore, it can be concluded that competition in the banking 
industry was perfect in those two years.  
Although 1998 shows monopolistic competition, the degree of competition is 
high, so we think there are no essential differences between 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, and 2000.  
In order to estimate the effect of the four largest banks, in equation (3) we add 
DL into the regression. The results are shown in Table 6. 
From 1996 to 2000, the H-statistics are 0.874, 0.997, 0.842, 0.862, and 0.960 
respectively. The hypothesis of H=1 cannot be rejected by the F-test at the 10% 
level in each year, indicating a state of perfect competition. In comparison with 
Table 5, there are no significant distinctions. Since the parameter of the dummy is 
not large and the t-value is also not large, the effect of DL is small. This is also 
shown in Nathan and Neave (1989), where the dummy for large banks has little 
effect on the estimation. 
 
 
4.4 The estimation of interest revenue as dependent variable  
In Molyneux et al. (1994), interest revenue is important in banks’ revenue, so 
the ratio of interest revenue to total revenue is a dependent variable. In order to 
find whether operating revenue or interest revenue is better as a dependent 
variable, when applying the Panzar-Rosse model in the Chinese banking industry, 
a regression with the interest revenue as a dependent variable is also estimated.  
 
iiiiii ASTePKLdBEcPFbaTIR ε++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝ ,       (6) 
Here, H=b+c+d and table 7 is the result of equation (6). 
To analyze the effect of DL and DA, when interest revenue is a dependent 
variable, we estimate equation (7) and (8). 
 
iiiiiii fDLASTePKLdBEcEIbaTIR ε+++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝ ,    (7) 
 
iiiiiii gDAASTePKLdBEcEIbaTIR ε+++++ lnlnlnlnln ＋＝             (8) 
Table 8 shows the results of equation (7). Clearly, when applying the 
Panzar-Rosse model to the Chinese banking industry, it is better to use operating 
revenue as a dependent variable. 
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4.5 Pooled panel data 
In order to test competition in the long run, we pooled the panel data from 1996 
to 2000. The results are shown in Table 9. Perfect competition cannot be rejected 
in any case except when operating revenue is a dependent variable and there is no 
DL. It can be surmised that during those five years, competition in the banking 
industry in China was close to perfect competition. In developing countries such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico from 1994 to 2001, using gross interest revenue as a 
dependent variable, the H-statistics are 0.71, 0.92, and 0.91 respectively. When 
total revenue is a dependent variable, the H-statistics are 0.62, 0.79, and 0.73 
respectively。On the other hand, the H-statistics of developed countries, such as 
the USA, UK, and Japan from 1994 to 2001, using gross interest revenue as a 
dependent variable, are 0.15, 0.60, and 0.53 respectively, and when operating 
revenue is a dependent variable, the H-statistics are 0.47, 0.78, and 0.53 
respectively.1 Compared with the developed countries, the degree of competition 
in the banking industry of developing countries is very high.  
 
4.6 Fixed effects model 
     Pooled panel data cannot describe the effect of each bank on competition. In this 
paper, we add the dummy for each bank, to estimate the H-statistic. Table 10 
shows the results. 
When operating revenue is used as a dependent variable, the H-statistic is 
0.922. Since H=1 cannot be rejected by the F-test, the competition is perfect. 
When interest revenue is used as a dependent variable, the t-value is not 
significant. It is obvious that using operating revenue as a dependent variable is 
better. 
 
4.7 A model with an area dummy 
From Table 2, it can be seen that there are banks which operate over the whole 
country (e.g., Construction Bank, Bank of China) and banks which operate in 
local areas (such as Guang Dong Developing Bank and Shanghai Bank). To 
estimate the effect of banks operating over the whole country versus operating in 
local areas, we add DA to the regression. Banks that operate over the whole 
country are given a value of unity, and those that operate in a local market a 
                                                  
1 See Claessens and Laeven (2003). 
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value of zero. From the results in table 11, we see that the parameter DA is very 
small and the t-value is not significant. It is clear from this that DA has little 
effect. The H-statistics show that the degree of competition is monopolistic 
competition but that the degree is very high. 
 
4.8 The test for the four largest banks from 1985 to 2001  
The total assets of the four largest banks make up 70% of total banking 
industry assets in China. In order to estimate the competition facing the four 
largest banks in the long run, panel data on them is pooled to compute the 
H-statistics. Since there was a financial reform in China in 1994, we estimate the 
H-statistics separately from1985-1993 and from 1995-2001.  
First, we test whether the market is in equilibrium or not. Table 12 shows the 
results of the equilibrium test. E=-0.365 but the P-value is 0.121, so E=0 cannot 
be rejected. Thus, the market of the four largest banks from 1985 to 2001 was in 
equilibrium.  
From the results in Table 13, we see that the competition in the two periods was 
monopolistic competition, and that the degree of competition from 1985-1993 was 
higher than from 1995-2001. It seems that the financial reform in 1994 provided 
greater protection from competition to the four largest banks. This may be the 
reason why the bad loans of the four largest banks failed to decrease.   
 
4.9 Test for competition from 1996 to 2000 among small banks 
 Bikker and Haaf (2002) explain that large banks operate businesses on an 
international scale and compete with others in the international market, so they 
are much more competitive than small banks which operate in a local market. In 
order to compare the degree of the competition between large banks and small 
banks, the competition of small banks is also estimated. From Table 14, it is clear 
that the competition among small banks is so high that it is perfect competition. 
This is not consistent with the results of Bikker and Haaf (2002). We believe the 
reason for this is that the small banks in China are newer, and are busy studying 
the managerial experience of international banks, and in addition they are not 
protected by the State.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used the Panzar-Rosse method to assess competition in 
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the banking industry in China from 1985 to 2001 in various ways. The Chinese 
banking system as a whole is in a state of near perfect competition, with a higher 
degree than other countries shown in previous studies. By year, for example, 1996, 
1997, 1999 and 2000 featured perfect competition, while 1998 was in monopolistic 
competition but with a high degree of competition. On the other hand, it is 
surprising to find that the competition among small banks from 1996 to 2000 was 
perfect. Since the dummy variables for the four largest banks and for banks that 
operate over the whole country have little effect on the estimation, we believe the 
results are robust. From these results, we can surmise that before its accession to 
the WTO, China’s banking industry already had the characteristics of 
competitiveness. It seems that opening the Chinese banking market to foreign 
firms will not promote further competition in China, though it might have effects 
on firms’ financing. 
However, there are some problems in this paper, such as the fact that data on 
wages and salaries, and long time series data are not available. If these problems 
can be solved, the competitiveness of the Chinese banking industry could be 
estimated much more correctly. It would also be meaningful to test the 
competitiveness after China’s accession to the WTO (after 2001), and the 
competitiveness of other developing countries. 
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Table 1. 
Banking Industry Competition by the Panzar-Rosse Method in Other Studies
Author(s) Period Studied Countries Results
Nathan and
Neave（1989） 1982-1984 Canada
1982 is perfect competition.
1983, 1984 are monopolistic
competition.
Shaffer and
Disalvo (1994) 1970-1986 Pennsylvania (USA)
Duopoly but high degree of
competitiveness.
M olyneux et al.
(1994) 1986-1989
Germany, the UK,
France and Spain
Germany, the UK, France and Spain
are near monopolistic competition. Italy
is monopoly.
Bikker and
Groeneveld
(2000) 1989-1996
15 countries in
Europe
Almost all countries are near
monopolistic competition. But
competition in Ireland and Denmark
are lower.
Gelos and
Roldos (2002) 1994-2000
European and Latin
American countries
(8 countries)
Argentina and Hungary are near perfect
competition. Others are monopolistic
competition.
Murjan and
Ruza （2002） 1993-1997 Arab Middle East
Monopolistic competition. Oil-producing
countries are less competitive than non-
oil countries.
Bikker and
Haaf (2002) 1988－1998 23 countries
Almost all countries are monopolistic
competition, but perfect competition
cannot be rejected in some case.
Competition of large banks is stronger
than the small banks.
Claessens and
Laeven (2003) 1994-2001 50 countries
The competition of Brazil, Greece,
Mexico are high, but the degree of USA,
Japan, Norway, Turkey are lower.
De Bandt and
Davis (2000) 1992-1996 4 countries
The competition of small banks is lower,
especially in France and Germany.
Niimi (1998)
1989-1991,
1994-1996 Japan
1989-1991 is monopoly.
1994-1996 is monopolistic competition.  
Note: This table is based on Bikker and Haaf (2002). 
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Table 2. 
 
Classification of Banks in China
Listed
company
Credit
rating
The People's Bank of China － －
National Development Bank － －
Export Import Bank of China － －
Agricultural Development Bank of China － －
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China － BB+
Bank of China － BB+
Agricultural Bank of China － BBpi
Construction Bank of China － BB+
National bank Bank of Communications － －
CITIC Industrial Bank － －
China Everbright Bank － Bpi
China Huaxia Bank ○ Bpi
Area bank China Ming Sheng Banking Corp., Ltd. ○ Bpi
Guang Dong Development Bank ○ CCCpi
ShenZhen Development Bank Co., Ltd. ○ Bpi
China Merchants Bank ○ BBpi
Fujian Industrial Bank － －
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank ○ BBpi
Shanghai Bank － －
Yantai House Saving Bank － －
Banpu House Saving Bank － －
Foreign bank branches
Trust investment companies, lease companies,
security companies, insurance companiesNon-bank 
State-owned
commercial bank
State policy bank
Name Type 
Central bank
Foreign bank
 
Note: The credit rating is from Standard & Poor’s in 2003. 
      Pi is the credit rating based on a portion of open data. 
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Table 3. 
 
Summary Statistics from 1996 to 2001
1996-2001
(Unit:million yuan） Maximum Minimum Mean Median St.Dev.
Operating revenue 79,681,700 4,676 5,049,781 612,294 11,503,445
Interest revenue 17,765,200 3,115 3,405,297 406,461 5,196,175
Expense of interest
rate+ Charge of
inter bank 72,867,200 2,261 3,605,479 306,226 10,074,744
Service charge +
Other operating
costs 2,316,700 6 283,924 32,015 592,718
Operating costs 3,832,700 1,246 847,850 126,100 1,240,942
Total asset 404,892,200 67,596 70,254,392 12,974,100 110,427,812  
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Table 4. 
 
Equilibrium Test for Each Year from 1996 to 2001
lnROA
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST E Adjusted R2
1996 14 -1.065 -1.095 0.533 0.149 -0.178 -0.413 0.467
　　 　　　ｔ -0.314 -2.566 3.565 0.344 -1.917
0.500 b
1997 15 -3.444 -1.215 0.296 -0.537 -0.363 -1.456 0.482
　　 　　　ｔ -0.737 -2.201 1.264 -0.800 -2.749
0.138 b
1998 14 5.452 -1.124 0.053 1.349 -0.487 0.277 0.432
　　 　　　ｔ 1.156 -1.849 0.216 1.839 -3.197
0.727 b
1999 13 0.124 -0.792 -0.014 1.161 -0.188 0.354 0.649
　　 　　　ｔ 0.052 -2.889 -0.119 2.722 -2.534
0.430 b
2000 15 -2.600 -0.070 -0.057 -0.619 -0.387 -0.747 0.164
　　 　　　ｔ -0.378 -0.084 -0.283 -0.652 -2.172
0.569 b
2001 14 -28.019 -3.613 -0.153 -2.437 -0.270 -6.203 0.350
　　 　　　ｔ -3.110 -2.966 -0.913 -2.173 -1.983
0.016 b
Note:  b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.  
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Table 5. 
 
H-statistic of Each Year When Operating Revenue Is a Dependent Variable
Operating
revenue
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST H Adjusted R2
1996 14 1.101 0.612 0.099 0.150 0.967 0.860 0.999
              t 2.493 11.017 5.078 2.648 79.900
0.101 a
0.000 b
1997 15 1.155 0.711 0.059 0.133 0.964 0.903 0.997
　　 　　　ｔ 1.770 9.217 1.812 1.420 52.331
0.460 a
0.000 b
1998 14 0.056 0.675 0.001 0.102 0.993 0.779 0.997
　　 　　　ｔ 0.120 11.279 0.049 1.419 66.196
0.017 a
0.000 b
1999 14 0.884 0.679 0.033 0.156 0.968 0.868 0.996
　　 　　　ｔ 1.407 9.511 1.059 1.371 54.103
0.279 a
0.000 b
2000 14 1.220 0.577 0.058 0.311 0.979 0.946 0.993
　　 　　　ｔ 1.261 4.682 2.053 2.273 37.606
0.767 a
0.000 b
Note: a is the  F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.  
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Table 6. 
 
H-statistic of Each Year with DL When Operating Revenue Is a Dependent Variable
Operating
revenue
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST DL H
Adjusted
R2
1996 14 1.120 0.620 0.098 0.156 0.969 -0.018 0.874 0.999
              t 2.318 7.584 4.474 2.143 50.914 -0.151
0.330
0.000
1997 15 0.870 0.763 0.034 0.200 1.004 -0.231 0.997 0.997
　　　　　　ｔ 1.300 8.989 0.925 1.914 28.150 -1.293
0.984 a
0.000 b
1998 14 -0.177 0.722 0.010 0.110 1.023 -0.151 0.842 0.997
　　　　　　ｔ -0.340 9.485 0.391 1.511 29.774 -0.996
0.148 a
0.000 b
1999 14 0.892 0.677 0.032 0.153 0.965 0.011 0.862 0.996
　　　　　　ｔ 1.306 8.069 0.867 1.131 20.863 0.053
0.431 a
0.001 b
2000 14 1.072 0.593 0.059 0.308 0.992 -0.058 0.960 0.992
　　　　　　ｔ 0.943 4.218 1.950 2.137 19.560 -0.296
0.840 a
0.001 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0
          DL is a dummy for the 4 largest banks.  
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Table 7 
 
H-statistic of Each Year When Interest Revenue Is a Dependent Variable
Interest
revenue
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST H Adjusted R2
1996 14 0.777 0.257 0.204 0.267 0.968 0.727 0.978
　　 　　　ｔ 0.326 0.856 1.944 0.875 14.823
0.526 a
0.112 b
1997 15 -1.777 0.127 0.038 0.276 1.035 0.440 0.976
　　 　　　ｔ -0.954 0.575 0.404 1.030 19.677
0.151 a
0.250 b
1998 14 -1.654 0.631 0.062 0.063 1.078 0.756 0.992
　　 　　　ｔ -1.831 5.417 1.321 0.449 36.938
0.133 a
0.001 b
1999 14 -1.303 0.096 0.069 0.787 1.130 0.952 0.994
　　 　　　ｔ -1.525 0.991 1.640 5.077 46.483
0.766 a
0.000 b
2000 14 -2.074 -0.002 0.092 0.760 1.146 0.850 0.987
　　 　　　ｔ -1.399 -0.013 2.100 3.635 28.762
0.592 a
0.012 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.  
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Table 8. 
 
H-statistic of Each Year When Interest Revenue Is a Dependent Variable With DL
Interest
revenue
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST DL H
Adjusted
R2
1996 14 0.675 0.208 0.210 0.232 0.956 0.103 0.650 0.975
　　　　　　ｔ 0.259 0.472 1.784 0.591 9.309 0.158
0.609 a
0.352 b
1997 15 -1.980 0.164 0.020 0.323 1.064 -0.165 0.507 0.974
　　　　　　ｔ -0.957 0.624 0.173 1.001 9.637 -0.298
0.291 a
0.278 b
1998 14 -1.791 0.659 0.067 0.067 1.096 -0.089 0.793 0.991
　　　　　　ｔ -1.679 4.215 1.274 0.452 15.534 -0.286
0.337 a
0.004 b
1999 14 -1.356 0.109 0.075 0.809 1.145 -0.071 0.992 0.994
　　　　　　ｔ -1.466 0.959 1.504 4.412 18.277 -0.261
0.974 a
0.002 b
2000 14 -2.248 0.016 0.092 0.758 1.161 -0.068 0.866 0.986
　　　　　　ｔ -1.289 0.075 1.989 3.422 14.928 -0.227
0.661 a
0.019 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0
          DL is a dummy for the 4 largest banks.  
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Table 9. 
 
H-statistic Using Panel Data from 1996 to 2000
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST DL H
Adjusted
R2
ln (Operating
revenue) 71 0.839 0.681 0.051 0.142 0.976 - 0.874 0.997
ｔ 3.781 28.927 4.925 3.953 143.124 -
0.002 a
0.000 b
ln (Interest
revenue) 71 -0.417 0.439 0.062 0.383 1.047 - 0.884 0.977
ｔ -0.619 6.131 1.997 3.499 50.552 -
0.341 a
0.000 b
ln (Operating
revenue) 71 0.715 0.710 0.048 0.167 0.997 -0.123 0.924 0.997
ｔ 3.191 26.752 4.718 4.519 84.055 -2.124
0.101 a
0.000 b
ln (Interest
revenue) 71 -0.410 0.437 0.063 0.381 1.046 0.007 0.881 0.977
ｔ -0.583 5.245 1.968 3.284 28.076 0.039
0.407 a
0.000 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0
          DL is a dummy for the 4 largest banks.
With dummy 
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Table 10. 
 
H-statistic Using Individual Effect Data from 1996 to 2000
Number of
observations lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST H
Adjusted
R2
ln(Operating
revenue ) 71 0.744 0.047 0.131 1.010 0.922 0.998
ｔ 18.940 3.581 2.539 0.788
0.198 a
0.000 b
71 0.343 0.085 0.247 0.788 0.675 0.987
3.403 2.504 1.859 6.668
0.038 a
0.000 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.
ln(Interest
revenue)
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Table 11. 
 
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST DA H
Adjusted
R2
71 1.022 0.672 0.054 0.159 0.967 0.053 0.885 0.997
　　 　　ｔ 3.967 27.648 5.144 4.209 102.642 1.374
0.006 a
0.000 b
71 0.633 0.387 0.084 0.476 0.995 0.302 0.946 0.979
　　 　　ｔ 0.841 5.440 2.720 4.319 36.157 2.690
0.652 a
0.000 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0
          DA is the dummy for banks that operate over the whole country.
ｌｎ(Interest
revenue)
H-statistic Using Pooled Panel Data with DA from 1996 to 2000
ln(Operating
revenue)
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Table 12. 
 
The Equilibrimum Test of The 4 Largest Banks from 1985 to 2001
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST E
Adjusted
R2
61 10.042 1.036 -0.223 -1.178 -1.000 -0.365 0.643
　　　　 ｔ 2.659 3.452 -1.177 -5.036 -5.881
0.121 b
Note: b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.  
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Table 13. 
 
H-statistic of the 4 Largest Banks from 1985-1993 and the H-statistic of the 4 Largest Banks from 1995 to 2001
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST H Adjusted R2
ln (Opeating
revenue) 35 4.623 0.524 0.080 0.161 0.757 0.765 0.977
ｔ 7.766 6.445 1.481 2.757 28.910
(1985-1993) 0.000 a
0.000 b
ln (Interest
revenue) 35 -2.314 2.393 -1.312 -0.726 0.725 0.354 0.330
ｔ -0.395 2.990 -2.458 -1.260 2.809
(1985-1993) 0.103 a
0.363 b
ln (Operating
revenue) 26 2.149 0.727 -0.011 -0.045 0.854 0.671 0.945
ｔ 1.498 16.259 -0.437 -0.430 9.094
(1995-2001) 0.011 a
0.000 b
ln (Interest
revenue) 26 11.466 0.172 0.037 -0.013 0.285 0.196 0.621
ｔ 8.146 3.916 1.492 -0.130 3.091
(1995-2001) 0.000 a
0.107 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.  
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Table 14. 
 
Number of
observations Constant lnEI lnBE lnPKL lnAST H Adjusted R2
52 0.923 0.690 0.061 0.197 0.993 0.947 0.994
　　　　　ｔ 3.644 20.711 5.675 4.551 82.732
0.359 a
0.000 b
52 -1.012 0.580 0.053 0.262 1.078 0.896 0.948
　　　　　ｔ -1.227 5.349 1.533 1.863 27.584
0.578 a
0.000 b
Note: a is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=1
          b is the F-statistic when the null hypothesis is H=0.
ln (Interest
revenue)
H-statistic of Small Banks from 1996 to 2000
ln (Operating
revenue)
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